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were repositioned on several occasions using 4 CH-54 sorties to move the howitzers with the remainder of battery personnel and equipment being moved by 9 CH-47 sorties. A special sling for the 155mm howitzers was fabricated by Support Command, 1st Cavalry Division. This capability permits 155's to occupy firing positions that would otherwise be inaccessible.

b. Individual and crew served night vision devices (Starlight Scopes) were used during Bong Son operations. The performance of these devices met the standards forecast by the new equipment training team. No significant problems have been noted and these devices are considered highly suitable for issue and use by troop units.

c. Sentry dogs have been used for security of Division base logistical areas to conserve manpower requirements for many months with good results. During MASHER/WHITE WING the Division requested support by the II Corps Scout Dog Platoon. These dogs arrived in the Bong Son area as the campaign was ending and were not available for use over a long enough period to properly evaluate their effectiveness on patrols or ambushes.

d. Extensive use was again made of the CV-2 aerial radio relay aircraft. The CV-2 relay initially went into operation 3 Feb 66 and was available for 1565 hours during the remainder of the campaign.

e. On 20 Feb 66 two special CH-47 medical evacuation missions were performed using the CH-47 hoist and non-rigid litter. The non-rigid litter enables seriously injured personnel to be hoisted into a hovering CH-47 from an inaccessible location. The litter used for this mission is: Litter, Semi-Rigid, Poleless FSN 6530-783-7600. The Medical Pod (CH-54 Pod converted to a medical treatment shelter) was employed for the first time during the campaign by the 15th Medical Battalion.

f. For the first time, riot control agent (RCA) CS was closely integrated in a combat role as an effective limited response weapon. On 4 February, 300 CS grenades were dropped from a helicopter dispenser on a suspected hospital location to determine by a CS reconnaissance whether any VC were present. Upon surveillance, no activity resulted and the area was entered with negative contact. Had there been enemy, fires were on call to destroy the fleeing enemy without further injury to the patients. On the same date a heavy concentration of CS was placed on a village at BS 785952 and loudspeakers were used to inform the people that they were not to fire at helicopters. This ended more than two days of sporadic firings from this village. In another village heliborne CS, coupled with a masked ground assault, aided in the capture of 17 Viet Cong suspects with only one enemy injury. Hand grenades were used in a similar role to clear a cave in the BLACK HORSE area where 43 VC had been pursued. All 43 departed the cave and were captured, with only one being killed who refused to surrender. CS hand grenades were also used throughout the operation in the search of many houses and tunnels to drive personnel from their hiding places and provide an opportunity to determine whether they were merely civilians hiding or were armed VC's. This limited response technique undoubtedly resulted in reducing the number of noncombat deaths in this highly populated area. It also greatly shortened the time for clearance and probably reduced friendly casualties. At the IRON TRIANGLE, CS followed immediately by artillery and rocket fires was used to drive the VC from their entrenchments and greatly increased the effectiveness of the artillery fires. The technique proved extremely effective and should be considered in the attack of any fortified area against unmasked enemy. A new first in this operation was the conduct of airmobile assaults into riot control agent areas with all personnel, including pilots, masked.

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12. Commander's Analysis.

a. Major Results of MASHER/WHITE WING include:

(1) In coordination with ARVN this Division made it possible to return 140,000 Vietnamese to GVN control through clearing the enemy from the coastal plain north of Bong Son. So far as is now known, the GVN intends to reestablish civil government in this area.

(2) Inhabitants of the An Lao and Son Long (Kim Song) Valleys were given a chance to be freed of VC domination by moving to areas which are under government control. About half the people given this chance did leave their homes and moved to areas controlled by the GVN.

(3) Enemy units which had long threatened Bong Son and Route 1 from Qui Nhon to Bong Son were dealt severe blows in personnel and equipment losses and in forced evacuation of formerly "secure" base areas. This Division fought all three regiments of the Sao Vang Division (the Quyet Chien, the Quyet Thang and the Quyet Tam). There is solid evidence that this Division rendered five of the nine battalions of their three regiments ineffective, and additionally, rendered ineffective the mortar company and recoilless rifle company of the Quyet Thang Regiment, and the anti-aircraft company and signal company of the Sao Vang Division. Three field hospitals supporting that division were captured. Specific losses include:

KIA (BC) - 1342

KIA (EST) - 1746

WIA (EST) - 1348

VCC - 633

(Includes a battalion commander, mortar company commander, and the executive officer of a regimental headquarters company)

VCS - 1067

Chei Hoi ralliers - 485

Individual weapons - 208

Crew served weapons - 52

(Includes one 105mm howitzer, ten 12.7mm and three 50 Cal AA machine guns)

Large quantities of ammunition of all type including  
126 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition.

Many documents were captured (1250 pounds of which 150 pounds promise useful intelligence).

Large quantities of communications equipment (FM and AM radios, telephones, wire, radio parts, PA systems).

Rice - captured and evacuated for refugees - 91 tons.

Salt - captured and evacuated for refugees - 14 tons.

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As a result of the severe damage done to their units the Sao Vang Division can be expected to be ineffective for a period of several months.

(4) The extended duration of this campaign enabled much tactical intelligence to be accumulated to support Division combat operations and provided the basis for higher headquarters to glean much technical and strategic intelligence. The development of the Sao Vang Division structure is a specific benefit of sustained operations. The tactical intelligence obtained enabled this Division to orient on the enemy and maintain contact every day for 41 consecutive days - an achievement virtually unheard of in this type of war.

(5) This Division again demonstrated an ability to air assault into even the most difficult terrain. This capability enabled Division units to surprise the enemy by landing above and behind his hillside defenses. The enemy was also surprised by the Division's capability for rapid entry "at will" into areas formerly regarded as VC strongholds. The demonstration that formerly safe havens are not in fact safe may cause the VC to modify their hard base system and move more frequently. If this course of action is undertaken the enemy will face increased resupply and assembly problems as well as becoming more exposed to friendly reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.

(6) The Division emplaced artillery (including the 155mm howitzer for the first time) on hilltops and other normally inaccessible sites to make tube artillery support constantly available to infantry and cavalry units.

(7) Division engineers built two fine airstrips - one north of Bong Son and one west of Phu Cat. The new airstrip west of Phu Cat will accept C-130 aircraft.

(8) Continuous psychological operations were conducted which produced prisoners and Chieu Hois and also kept the inhabitants within the operational areas informed as to what was happening and what they should do to avoid harm and to return to government control. The extended duration of the campaign and the resulting tactical intelligence enabled advantages to be taken of "breaks" as they occurred such as the capture of key personnel and loss of support facilities.

(9) Combat operations were conducted in a densely populated area, strongly defended by the VC, with remarkably little damage to friendly or potentially friendly inhabitants of the area. This result is a tribute to the careful way in which commanders at all levels explained and enforced the rules of engagement and to the manner in which the individual soldier carried out these difficult instructions.

(10) MASHER/WHITE WING was highlighted by cooperation and coordination between this Division and the ROKs, ARVN, US Navy, US Marines, and US Air Force in prolonged and complex operations. The results will enhance the confidence and mutual respect of each of these forces for the other.

(11) This Division kept at least four infantry battalions (and six for the majority of the period) in sustained operations for 41 days at an average distance from the Division An Khe base of 65 kilometers. Battalions and brigades were switched with far less loss of momentum than heretofore and the enemy was kept under constant pressure. The Division thus laid to rest any residual doubt about an airmobile division's ability to conduct sustained combat.

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b. Lessons Learned.

(1) Experience during MASHER/WHITE WING indicates the desirability of providing a platoon size force from a reserve unit in readiness to secure downed aircraft pending completion of aircraft recovery. This procedure avoids the need to use ground units having other tasks with the mission thereby disrupting operations already in progress. This reserve ready force can be employed as an Eagle Flight or kept on the ground prepared for immediate take off.

(2) Flush tactics. This technique was used effectively during the EAGLES CLAW action in the lower Kim Song Valley by the 3d Brigade and later the 1st Brigade. About two thirds of the force takes up well concealed ambush positions covering natural routes in and out of the area. This ambush force is positioned by carefully chosen flight routes and deceptive landings. The ambush force is prepared for 48 hours operations without resupply. The remainder of the force lands in the center of the area and acts as "beaters" moving toward the ambush forces. Based on observed movements away from the beater force, artillery and air interdiction is used on routes between the beater and ambush forces at night. As an example 1/5 Cav found 8 VC KIA, 1 rocket launcher, and two metal containers of small arms ammunition on 18 Feb (BR 766747) when moving through a route interdicted under these circumstances.

(3) Attacking ground units can best exploit close artillery and TAC Air support in mountainous terrain when directions of flight or gun-target lines generally parallel the long axis of the objective area (i.e., valley floor or ridge line). The ground force can attack from a direction perpendicular to the line of flight or fire with greater safety. Also more of the ordnance will be expended in the intended objective areas than when direction of flight or firing is "cross" compartment.

c. Civil Affairs Activity.

(1) The following is a summary of the 1st Air Cavalry Division civil affairs/civic action activities conducted during operations in An Lao and Hoai Nhon districts (MASHER and WHITE WING) and in Hoai An district (EAGLE'S CLAW), to include the BLACK HORSE phase, as of 6 March 1966.

(a) Refugees in Bong Son prior to the operation totaled 7,806. As operations began, approximately 13,000 war victims moved to Hwy 1. District officials initially permitted 3,400 true refugees to enter Bong Son and kept evacuees north of area DOG. During An Lao Valley operations, 4,500 refugees moved to Bong Son. Of these, the division transported 3,491 refugees from An Lao Valley by helicopters. At the end of operations, Bong Son contained 15,836 refugees and Hwy 1 north of area DOG contained 11,806 evacuees. Hoai Nhon District now contains a total of 27,652 refugees and evacuees.

(b) Refugees in Hoai An District prior to 11 Feb 66 totaled 7,514. Subsequent operations freed over 10,000 war victims most of whom occupied vacant buildings or moved into homes of friends between area BIRD and District Headquarters. The Division evacuated 320 refugees by helicopter. A total of 2,876 refugees from the Song Lon Valley moved to secure areas by foot with their food supplies and personal belongings. The refugee population in Hoai An District is presently 17,622.

(c) In Hoai Nhon and An Lao Districts the Division has captured and evacuated 47 tons of rice and 14 tons of salt to the District Headquarters in Bong Son. Evacuation was made by CH-47 aircraft. In

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In addition a two-ton cache of rice was captured at BS 843097 and distributed to needy, local civilians.

(d) In Hoai An District the Division captured 42½ tons of rice. Twenty and one-half tons of this rice and ten pigs were delivered by helicopter to the District Headquarters. The remaining 22 tons of rice was evacuated from BR 825828 and BR 825821 by 900 civilians acting under orders from the District Chief. Small quantities of VC medical supplies, text books, and clothing were captured and presented to VN medical personnel.

(e) During sick call activities in Hoai Nhon and An Lao Districts, the Division treated 2,362 Vietnamese patients and evacuated 62 seriously injured personnel to the Bong Son dispensary. Medical treatment was provided along Hwy 1 and in areas adjacent to tactical operations to assist the GVN. Treatment was given on 33 occasions at 19 different locations.

(f) In Hoai An District a total of 707 patients were treated. Three seriously injured patients were evacuated to the district dispensary. Treatment was given on twelve different occasions in the vicinity of areas DUCK and BIRD.

(g) Hoai Nhon District officials, MACV advisors, and 22d ARVN Division personnel established four civilian supply distribution and medical aid points on Hwy 1 (BS 812130, BS 903098, BS 892070, and BR 880997). The following items were distributed to evacuees along Hwy 1 and to refugees from the An Lao Valley: Bulgar wheat - 101,876 lbs, cooking oil - 984 gal, and canned milk - 648 cans.

(h) Hoai An District officials and MACV advisor distributed the following USAID supplies to refugees: Bulgar wheat - 68,640 lbs, cooking oil - 1,520 gal, and canned milk - 480 cans. The following items were furnished to the district headquarters by the Division for civic action support of war victims: blankets - 30, soap - 75 bars, VIS magazines - 200, blue medical shirts - 120, and blue medical trousers - 240. GVN civilian supply support of refugees was reduced because the District Chief permitted refugees to return to their homes to retrieve food and clothing.

(i) A total of 75 Chieu Hoi's surrendered to GVN officials during operations in Hoai An District. Of these five utilized safe conduct passes; 50 were VC guerillas; and 25 were infrastructure cadre.

(j) During operations in Hoai Nhon and An Lao Districts a total of 408 Chieu Hoi surrendered to GVN officials. Of these, 270 used leaflets to surrender; 302 were VC guerillas; and 106 were infrastructure cadre.

(k) The 401st Scout Company, 22d ARVN Division, assisted the Division in evacuation of captured supplies in Hoai Nhon District by furnishing 100 soldiers to secure cache sites and to sack and load supplies aboard aircraft.

(l) The following short-term, high-impact projects were utilized during operations:

1. Coordination effected with EOD team from 184th Ord Bn to remove 500, 250, and 100 pound bombs from near Vietnamese hamlets (BS 890062, BS 901129, and BS 895126).

2. Candy distributed to children.

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3. Engineer units repaired Bong Son streets and the roads leading to the three refugee camps.

4. Water pump installed at Hoai Nhon District dispensary.

5. VC monument was destroyed at BS 882062.

6. Division assisted in obtaining Bong Son Catholic priest to perform service for VN civilians in Hoai An District.

7. Action initiated to construct well and latrine in new Bong Son refugee camp.

8. Unit solatium contribution, letter of condolence, CARE fabric kit, and cooking oil presented through GVN district officials to grandparents of 6 year old Bong Son traffic victim.

(m) In conjunction with GVN official, CARE fabric kits and assistance in claims form preparation given to VN man and girl who received minor injuries in ARA misfire in Bong Son.

(n) Vietnamese widow, child, and relative escorted to cemetery in Division CP area to permit mourning at husband's grave.

(o) Hoai Nhon District Chief presented 20,000 sheets of leaflet paper featuring GVN flag for use in local VIS Psy Ops program. Assistance given VIS in formulation of special news bulletin published and distributed in Bong Son area.

(p) Gifts of cooking oil, fabric kits, and clothes distributed to 11 VN citizens who forfeited property for forward division CP area and access roads. Assistance given in preparation of claims forms and GVN officials encouraged to expedite processing.

(2) Conclusion: These operations have been the first real test for the Division in conducting military operations in a very densely populated area. Our past operations were primarily in uninhabited or sparsely settled areas, where our concern was almost exclusively on killing VC. During present operations there were three major problems anticipated, all of which did in fact require massive efforts to solve.

(a) Minimizing non-combatant casualties.

(b) Control, segregation and handling of large numbers of refugees.

(c) Evacuation of captured supplies.

By careful prior planning and team work with all GVN, U.S. civilian and U.S. military organizations we feel we have successfully met the problems, each of which was as serious as anticipated.

d. Psy War Activities.

(1) Non-combatants. Advance information prior to MASHERR/WHITE WING indicated that a hostile or non-cooperative attitude should be expected in areas long under VC domination such as An Lao Valley, Kim Song Valley, and the northern portion of the coastal plain. This forecast was not borne out during actual operations. The attitude of the population has been favorable to GVN but directly proportional to the status of

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fighting troops in contact with the population. When US Forces move into an area, the people expect to receive benefits and protection, consequently they reciprocate with information and tend to deny the NVA/VC food and shelter. When the US Forces start to leave or when the population detects a reduction in friendly strength the information flow is reduced.

(2) Enemy combatants.

(a) The NVA/VC have become steadily more responsive to the Psy War effort. This was related to the status of food, casualties, sickness, and fighting capability of the enemy. At the beginning of Operation MASHER the Chieu Hoi's were local force VC but as the enemy units were chased, beaten, and harassed, a number of NVA cadre surrendered rather than dying. During the final 10 days of Feb, NVA officers and enlisted men rallied with safe conduct passes. Fear of artillery and air attacks was frequently mentioned by captured personnel. This is significant since these ralliers have indicated the VC orders are to shoot any who attempt to rally. The NVA ralliers are confused and openly state that they were told their mission was to free the people but they see that the Vietnamese people are enjoying a reasonably good life now.

(b) However, the problem of large scale defection or rallying is still to be solved. The ralliers have been individuals to date, and although they have freely given much valuable information and recorded loudspeaker tapes exhorting their comrades to rally by name, only individuals have responded regardless of their condition. Some theme must be developed in coordination with tactical operations that will strike the right response in these people so that the Chieu Hoi program will increase from a trickle of individuals to a flow of NVA units. Various themes are being worked on in close coordination with tactical operations with this objective in mind.

(3) Psy War Organization.

(a) Both the 24th and 245th Psy War Detachments were deactivated during Feb and the 245th Psy Ops Co was formed at FFORCEV, NHA TRANG. The total support available to the Division did not change; it is normally one 3-man HE loudspeaker team for operations with the Division's 8 maneuver battalions. This force is augmented with up to three additional HE teams as other major II Corps tactical units release their attached teams when they are not committed on operations.

(b) In addition, and in conjunction with the FFORCEV Psy Op officer, the USAF 5th Air Commando Sqdn furnished a loudspeaker equipped U-10 aircraft with crew. This aircraft was available during the entire Bong Son campaign except for short periods when it was being exchanged. During three periods, it was augmented with a second U-10 aircraft.

(c) The Div Psy Op Officer coordinated missions directly with FFORCEV Psy Op representatives who utilized the above resources to accomplish the requested missions. In addition FFORCEV accomplished other ARVN, and US Marine missions with the same aircraft.

(4) Psy War Operations. Psy Op planning was closely coordinated with the tactical operations.

(a) During strikes on populated areas from which aircraft receive fire, there were three phases of warnings:

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1. Warning phase which consisted of both loudspeaker and leaflet messages warning the population about firing on aircraft. Refer to item 1, Inclosure 4.

2. The Evacuation Phase in which both loudspeaker and leaflet messages told the people that fire continued to be received and that the VC in the villages would be attacked. The non-combatants were advised to move to a specific safe location. Item 2, 3, 3a, of Inclosure 5.

3. After the strike a loudspeaker message advised the non-combatants that the VC were responsible for the attack on the village. Item 4, 5, of Inclosure 4.

(b) The loudspeaker aircraft monitored the artillery and Air Force fire nets and was in a position immediately after a strike to drop safe conduct passes, leaflets and broadcast a rally message. Item 6, Inclosure 4.

(c) Whenever a Chieu Hoi was interrogated and volunteered statements, the Psy Op personnel in conjunction with the JUSPAO representatives taped an appropriate rally message. This listed comrades' names and the mission was flown over known enemy locations. Specific rally instructions were included. Item 7, 7a, 8, 9, Inclosure 4.

(d) Night as well as day missions were coordinated to enhance the superstitious beliefs of the enemy. Funeral dirges and weird wailing broadcast were played over an area after a period of heavy contact. Emphasis was placed on VC dead not receiving proper burial. Item 6, Inclosure 4.

(e) Psy Op missions were utilized as part of deception programs to direct the enemy attention away from proposed operational areas. An effective approach was to drop "Don't Fire at Aircraft" leaflets in an area in conjunction with an H&I program and Cavalry Squadron operations to focus the enemy's attention away from the area in which operations were planned. Item 1, 2, 3, Inclosure 4.

(f) Non-combatants were urged to deny the VC food, shelter, and other help as friendly troops moved into an area. This was closely coordinated with civic action missions of sick call and refugee movement. Item 10, 11, 12, Inclosure 4.

(4) Psy Ops Ground Team Activities.

(a) Loudspeaker surrender and demoralization broadcast were conducted in direct support of sweep operations.

(b) Control of civilians during search and destroy operations was accomplished to reduce civilian casualties by announcing instructions before and during operations.

(c) Interrogation of VCC and VCS was made to obtain immediate tactical OB, VC troop environment, VC troop locations, and other information necessary for subsequent leaflet and loudspeaker operations.

(d) Groups of civilians were indoctrinated as to allied presence, Chieu Hoi Program, GVN policies and objectives.

(e) Loudspeaker appeals were coordinated with artillery and mortar leaflet fires. Surrender appeals were delivered to known VC guerilla locations.

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(f) The teams persuaded civilians to lead combat patrols to guerrilla hideouts resulting in apprehension of 16 VCS and removal of 76 women and children from mountains. (Coordinates BS 7208).

(g) Battalion commanders were provided with immediate enemy OB learned during interrogations.

(h) A team requested and received demolitions to destroy VC monuments as a part of civilian indoctrination program. An Do (1) (BS 8520).

(i) The teams continuously helped identify, interrogate, process and control VCS during all operations.

(j) Civilians were controlled and instructed during static situations.

(k) The Chieu Hoi program was advertised, i.e., money for weapons, resettlement program. Item 14, Inclosure 4.

(5) The following Psy Ops performance data indicate that scope of the 1st Cavalry Division Psy Ops effort in the Bong Son area during Feb 66:

(a) 91 loudspeaker missions were flown. The total speaker time was 62 hours and 45 minutes. (Representative examples of six loudspeaker tapes which were recorded and broadcast by this Hq, during Feb are listed as items 1 thru 6, Inclosure 4.

(b) 72 leaflet missions were flown. A total of 3,413,000 leaflets were distributed in the Bong Son Campaign area. Examples of messages are listed as items 7 thru 14, Inclosure 4.

(c) There were 54 HE loudspeaker team days in support of the 1st Cavalry Division's Bong Son Campaign during Feb.

(6) Visible results of Psy Ops support are not as readily recorded as other forms of support for combat operations and their impact remains largely a matter of judgement with regard to each operation. In addition the results of this support can be gained by any friendly units in the area and can extend past the termination of field operations by the unit initiating the Psy War activity. Some specific results that are known to have resulted from the Division Psy Ops effort includes:

(a) A total of 485 Chieu Hoi's have been recorded thru all available sources through 6 Mar. Of these over 270 had safe conduct passes. All state they heard the loudspeaker broadcasts. Evidence of latent effect of Psy War activity is reflected by GVN reports of 115 additional Chieu Hoi's in the Bong Son area during the week following termination of Operation WHITE WING. Most of these returnees had leaflets or stated they had heard the loudspeaker appeals or both.

(b) In coordination with G-5, loudspeaker messages were broadcast to non-combatants warning them to move out of a populated areas from which we were receiving fire and where we were planning fires. In such cases, the value of the Psy War program can hardly be evaluated since it is the absence of non-combatant casualties which is the result. However, there are the tangible effects observed from loudspeaker missions in which the civilians are moved to an area by loudspeaker alone for screening, sick call and subsequent refugee movement. Over 4,500 refugees responded to such appeals.

a. A ninth infantry battalion be added to the Airmobile Division to provide increased infantry strength and flexibility for operations in Vietnam. Justification for an additional infantry battalion includes:

- (1) A two battalion brigade cannot maintain a significant reserve prepared for immediate commitment. Frequent opportunities arise to decisively engage small VC groups provided the required troops can be positioned on the ground within a period of a few minutes.
- (2) During MASHER/WHITE WING this Division was fortunate in being able to depend on ROK or 22d ARVN Division elements to provide security for aircraft bases, forward supply points and command posts. Some combat power must be devoted to this purpose when these conditions do not exist.

(3) At this time two infantry battalions are required for Division base defense and TAQR operations.

(4) Reserve/reaction forces required by higher headquarters (one or two battalions) must necessarily be designated from those in the area of operations thus restricting their freedom of employment in the operational area.

b. This Division is authorized 60 ARVN NCO interpreters. Of this number an average of 52 has been present for duty considering leaves and other absences. Division G2 and 191st MI Det have a continuing priority requirement for 18 interpreters to support prisoner interrogation and document translation requirements. The remaining interpreters are so few that they cannot be assigned lower than infantry battalion level. Reports from all combat operations of this Division have consistently noted a requirement for an interpreter at company level for immediate questioning of VCC and suspects as well as issuing instructions to noncombatants. This Division has submitted three letter requests for authorization of 45 additional ARVN NCO interpreters for a total of 105 for the Division. The shortage of interpreters is understood here but the urgency of the requirement cannot be overstated.

c. During Operation MASHER/WHITE WING (25 Jan - 28 Feb 66) Division mission ready aircraft averaged 62.4 percent and the average EDP was 15.1 percent (both averages include float aircraft). Major items causing the high EDP were CH-47 bearings, engines, and transmissions; UH-1 main rotor blades, engines and transmissions; and CH-47 forward and aft controls, blades, and transmission. Action was taken early in Feb to improve the Division's aircraft parts status by dispatching a Division and USARV representative to CONUS to fill zero balance items of the aircraft parts ASL. As a result of this special effort parts were shipped from CONUS beginning 25 Feb and began to arrive at An Khe commencing 2 Mar 66. This special


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procedure will greatly assist the Division's aircraft parts status over the next two or three months. However, it is important that continuing attention be placed on establishing an aircraft repair parts supply system that will provide a dependable response to routine aircraft parts requisitions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



MALCOLM R. BAER

Lt Col, AGC

Adjutant General

4 Inclosures

15 Overlays

6 Aerial Photographs

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RESULTS OF 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION OPERATIONS

ENEMY LOSSES

	PHASE I (24 - 27 Jan)	PHASE II (28 Jan - 3 Feb)	PHASE III (4 - 10 Feb)	PHASE IV (11 - 26 Feb)	PHASE V (1 - 6 Mar)	TOTAL
KIA (BC)*	37	566	11	709	19	1342
KIA (EST)	41	915	18	760	12	1746
WIA (EST)	-	357	-	978	13	1348
VCC	27	215	108	245	40	633
VCS	81	378	186	340	102	1087
Indiv Wpns	2	49	10	142	5	208
Crew Served *pns	-	6	-	46	0	52

FRIENDLY LOSSES

KIA	2	119 (Note 1)	0	107	(Note 2)	228 (Note 1-2)
WIA	25	195	49	512	7	788
MTA	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE 1 - The Phase II total of 119 includes 42 Division personnel killed in a C-123 crash 25 Jan 66.

2 - Four USAF crew members were killed in the C-123 crash 25 Jan 66 and two USAF FAC's were killed in an O-1 crash 2 Mar 66. USAF losses are not included in the tabulation above.

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**TOTAL ENEMY LOSSES**

1ST AIR CAV (NOTE 1) ARVN (NOTE 1) ROK (NOTE 1)

	KIA	WIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	TOTAL	KIA	WIA	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
KIA (RC)	603	739	1342	465	193	658	49	101	150	2150
KIA (EST)	490	790	1746	235	15	250	49	23	92	2078
TOTAL	1559	1529	3088	700	208	908				
WIA (EST)	357	991	1348							
VCO	242	591	633	59	97	111	20	135	31	761
VCS	459	628	1087	30	217	347	57	76	135	1567
INDIVIDUAL WPIRS	49	159	208	44	24	68	4	9	13	289
CANN/ SERVED WPIRS	6	46	52	5	6	11	1	1	2	65
(WEAPONS)										

105mm How 1 - (Represents recovery of an ARVN 105mm How - this weapon was recovered as separate parts and was not in operable condition)

75mm RR 6

12.7/50 cal MG 13

**(AMMUNITION)**

105mm How	126 rds
82mm Mort	91 rds
60mm Mort	172 rds
75mm RR	22 rds
57mm RR	8 rds
Grenades	860
Small Arms	28,600 rds

**(OTHER MATERIAL)**

Radios	10
Telephones	13
Medicine	39 boxes
Documents	1,250 lbs
Piasters	41,300

NOTE 1 - 1st Cav Div totals are through 6 Mar 66. ARVN and ROK totals are 28 Feb 66.

Incl 1<sup>2</sup>

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION  
TOTAL AIRCRAFT MISSIONS AND SORTIES

25 Jan - 6 Mar

MISSIONS

UH-1	32,348
OH-13	6,457
CH-47	4,131

SORTIES

UH-1	59,272
OH-13	9,156
CH-47	5,957

TIME

UH-1	19,371 hours
OH-13	4,462
CH-47	2,357
O-1	289

Incl 1<sup>3</sup>

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION  
AVIATION/COMBAT ARMS SUPPORT STATISTICS

1. PHASE I and II (24 Jan - 3 Feb )

a. Total Inf Bn's airlifted	- 17
b. Total Arty Btrys Airlifted	- 10
c. Total Tons Cargo Airlifted	- 3,392.9
d. Total Passengers Airlifted	- 24,989

2. PHASE III (4 Feb - 10 Feb)

a. Total Inf Bns Airlifted	- 10
b. Total Arty Btrys Airlifted	- 22
c. Total Tons Cargo Airlifted	- 1,875
d. Total Passengers Airlifted	- 16,164

3. PHASE IV (11 - 28 Feb)

a. Total Inf Bns Airlifted	- 39
b. Total Arty Btrys Airlifted	- 23
c. Total Tons Cargo Airlifted	- 3,971
d. Total Passengers Airlifted	- 37,073

4. PHASE V (1 - 6 Mar)

a. Total Inf Bns Airlifted	- 12
b. Total Arty Btrys Airlifted	- 0
c. Total Tons Cargo Airlifted	- 462
d. Total Passengers Airlifted	- 15,125

5. Campaign Totals (25 Jan - 6 Mar)

a. Total Inf Bns Airlifted	- 78
b. Total Arty Btrys Airlifted	- 55
c. Total Tons Cargo Airlifted	- 9700.9
d. Total Passengers Airlifted	- 93,351

Incl 14

PHASE I (25 - 27 Jan)

- A. Aircraft hit = 21
- B. Casualties = 1 KIA + WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 1
- D. Altitude of aircraft shot down - between 100 and 500'.
- E. Aircraft lost = 1

PHASE II (28 Jan thru 3 Feb)

- A. Aircraft hit = 91
- B. Casualties = 3 KIA 23 WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 6
- D. Altitudes of aircraft shot down:
  - 5 between 0 and 100'
  - 1 between 100 and 500'
- E. Aircraft recovered = 5 ( 1 not repairable)
- F. Aircraft lost = 2

PHASE III (4 thru 10 Feb) A. Aircraft hit = 17

- B. Casualties = 5 WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 1
- D. Aircraft recovered = 1
- E. Altitude of aircraft shot down - 0 - 100'.

PHASE IV ( 11 thru 28 Feb )

- A. Aircraft hit = 99
- B. Casualties = 2 KIA 21 WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 6
- D. Altitudes at which shot down - 100 to 500'.
- E. Aircraft recovered = 5
- F. Aircraft lost = 1

PHASE V. (1 thru 6 Mar)


- A. Aircraft hit = 7
- B. Casualties = 2 WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 0

TOTALS:

- A. Aircraft hit = 241
- B. Casualties = 6 KIA and 55 WIA
- C. Aircraft shot down = 14
- D. Aircraft recovered = 11
- E. Aircraft lost = 3
- F. Altitudes of aircraft shot down:
  - 5 between 0 - 500'
  - 9 between 100 and 500'.

Incl 15

85  
08 +



Company C, in three lifts, had its first lift dropped into LZ 4 at 0825 hours, and the final lift was dropped at 0845 hours. Some small arms fire was received by aircraft on all three lifts as the aircraft were on final. However, no fire was received by either Company C or the aircraft on the ground. Company C was separated into four separated groups approximately 1000 meters from NW to SE. As the company attempted to regroup at 0851 hours, sniper fire and some mortar fire was received by Company C. The sniper fire was from all sides. Company C remained separated and unable to maneuver.

COMPANY C POSITION

Company A (consisting of only 2 rifle platoons - air crash of 25 Jan 66) departed LZ 2, shown as position 1, at 0900 hours. The mission was to sweep areas between LZ 2 and LZ 4 with destination being at LZ 4. By approximately 0945 hours Company A reached position 2 and could observe the area of LZ 4. Company A continued to move without enemy contact to position 3 where it made radio contact and smoke identification with an element of Company C.

## 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION

ARTILLERYTOTAL MISSIONS AND ROUNDS FIRED

<u>TYPE RDS</u>	<u>Phase I (25-27 Jan) Msns/Rds</u>	<u>Phase II (28 Jan-3 Feb) Msns/Rds</u>	<u>Phase III (4-10 Feb) Msns/Rds</u>	<u>Phase IV (11-17 Feb) Msns/Rds</u>	<u>Phase V (1-6 March) Msns/Rds</u>	<u>TOTAL Msns/Rds</u>
105 How	343/1955	824/28,833	654/16,800	5835/21,084	501/6700	8137/69756
155mm How		457/6,182	306/1797	759/2778	224/1233	1744/11990
8" How	60/166	256/2,077	133/657	547/2345	112/391	1108/5470
175mm How	10/20	10/59	200/522	227/523	0/0	447/1,124
2.75mm RKT	87/2475	143/5407	139/3070	272/12,270	20/1729	661/24851

## RESULTS OF ARTILLERY FIRE

	<u>KIA (BC) Tube/ARA</u>	<u>KIA (EST) Tube/ARA</u>	<u>WIA (EST) Tube/ARA</u>
Phase I	2/3	8/46	6/29
Phase II	18/100	80/51	44/18
Phase III	20/2	11/7	3/0
Phase IV	112/65	128/131	9/10
Phase V	<u>0/0</u>	<u>6/0</u>	<u>10/0</u>
TOTAL	152/170	227/235	62/57

Incl 1<sup>6</sup>

## USAF TAC AIR SUMMARY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FLGDN</u>	<u>Number Sorties</u>	<u>TONS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED</u>				<u>RESULTS</u>	
			<u>GP BOMBS</u>	<u>NAPALM</u>	<u>FRAG</u>	<u>WP</u>		
25 Jan 66	8		NO MISSIONS					
26 Jan 66	8	6.5		3.75	0	1.4	15 Structures destroyed	
27 Jan 66	10	5.4		3	0	2.6	5 Structures destroyed 2 Structures damaged	
28 Jan 66	6	4.75		.5	0	.2		
29 Jan 66	10	12.25		10.5	0	1.2	10 Structures destroyed 8 Structures damaged 1 Secondary Explosion 50 VC KBA (Est)	
30 Jan 66	16	11		1.5	8.7	.2	59 Structures destroyed 75 Structures damaged 2 Secondary Explosion	
31 Jan 66	31	44.8		2.25	7.85	1.1	4 AW Psns destroyed 2 Sampans destroyed 30 Structures destroyed 25 Structures damaged 12 KBA (Est)	
1 Feb 66	35	19.75		21.75	10.08	2.3	4 Structures destroyed 21 Structures damaged 5 bunkers destroyed 1 Secondary Explosion	
2 Feb 66	25	10.0		7.75	2.3	1.5	2 Bunkers Destroyed	
3 Feb 66	12	4.5		1.25	8.0	1.0	5 Structures destroyed 3 Structures damaged 1 bunker damaged 1 bunker destroyed 1 Secondary Explosion 6-8 KBA (Est)	

## ARTILLERY DISPLACEMENTS

	<u>Btry Moves by Air*</u>	<u>Btrvs Moves by Ground</u>
Phase I	1	17
Phase II	5	3
Phase III	8	5
Phase IV	24	28
Phase V	0	17

\*Each Battery move averages 12 sorties per battery

DATE	NUMBER SORTIES FLOWN	TONS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED					RESULTS
		GP BOMBS	NAPALM	FRAG	WP		
27 Feb 66	24	11.35	4.75	3.775			1 hut destroyed 5 cows KBA
28 Feb 66	18	25.6	5.0	8.76			4 huts destroyed 20 huts damaged
1 Mar 66	22	45.2	2.0	20.3	.4		Bomb damage assessment
2 Mar 66	11	12.0		4.0			for 1-4 Mar was 90 percent
3 Mar 66	28	21.3	15.4	29.8	5.4		target coverage. No other
4 Mar 66	21	34.8	5.0		1.6		results reported.
5 Mar 66	0						
6 Mar 66	0						
TOTALS	600	427.25	165.30	265.32	80.15 (Note 1)		

Note 1 - For the period 18 Feb - 28 Feb a separate record was not kept of Frag and WP. It is estimated that 18 tons of the total Frag expended for this period was actually WP.

DATE	NUMBER SORTIES FLOWN	TONS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED					RESULTS
		GP BOMBS	NAPALM	FRAG	WT		
4 Feb 66	8	5.25	.75	0	2.75	1. Structure destroyed 2 Bunkers destroyed	
5 Feb 66	10	4.25	1.5	2.5	1.0		
6 Feb 66	ALL MISSIONS	CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER					
7 Feb 66	10	1.5	9.0	6.5	1.2	15 Structures destroyed	
8 Feb 66	6	3.75			27.0	34 Structures destroyed 18 Structures damaged 100 meters of trench destroyed	
9 Feb 66	10	5.3	9.0	1.4	1.7	19 Structures destroyed 1 Bunker destroyed 1 KIA (est)	
10 Feb 66	4	1.0		1.4			
11 Feb 66	16	8.75	1.2	5.4	2.1	47 Structures destroyed 18 Structures damaged 1 Secondary explosion	
12 Feb 66	10	3.25	1.8	7.2	.5	14 Structures destroyed 10 Structures damaged 8 KIA (est)	
13 Feb 66	6	2.25	3.9	2.0	.4	1 Structures destroyed 1 Structure damaged	

DATE	NUMBER SORTIES FLOWN	TONS OF ORDNANCE EXENDED				RESULTS
		GP BOMBS	NAPALM	FRAG	WP	
14 Feb 66	2	1.5	1.5		.4	4 Structures destroyed
15 Feb 66	9	8.0	2.5	1.0	2.4	25 Structures destroyed 10 Structures damaged 7 KBA (est)
16 Feb 66	17	14.5	2.7		2.1	10 Foxholes destroyed
17 Feb 66	16	8.7	7.8		1.7	6 Structures destroyed 2 Structures damaged
18 Feb 66	13	8.2	3.6	3.05		4 KBA
19 Feb 66	29	11.2	10.5	9.76		4 huts destroyed
20 Feb 66	38	20.5	4.75	8.46		6 KBA (est)
21 Feb 66	19	7.75	6.75	4.66		1 KBA 10 KBA (est) 2 huts damaged
22 Feb 66	12	9.0	3.3	2.2		10 KBA
23 Feb 66	16	5.3	3.75	1.32		6 huts destroyed
24 Feb 66	12	7.3	6.0	.1		39 huts destroyed 5 huts damaged
25 Feb 66	17	5.5	8.85	.6		5 KBA 4 huts damaged 5 huts destroyed
26 Feb 66	35	15.2	.75	4.2		24 huts destroyed 12 huts damaged 1 secondary explosion